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LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - MOTOR VEHICLES - STATUTES CON-
TROLLING DIRECT DEALER SELLING AGREEMENTS. - AUTOMOBILE
DEALERS ACT, PUB. L. No. 1026, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 8,
1956). A supplement to the federal anti-trust law was enacted to
control the franchise agreements between automobile manufac-
turers engaged in interstate commerce and their dealers. The
statute gives the dealer a cause of action in a United States dis-
trict court if the manufacturer terminates or fails to renew the
distributive franchise without the exercise of "good faith." "Good
faith" is defined as dealing in a "fair and equitable manner," free
from "coercion and intimidation or the threats of intimidation
or coercion." The only requirement the dealer must meet under
the statute is that he has also dealt with the manufacturer in
"good faith." U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6589-90 (1956).
Congress intended the law to give the dealer the right to
a judicial determination of the presence or absence of "good
faith" notwithstanding the terms of contract between the parties.
The House Judiciary Committee report on the statute enumerated
several policy reasons for the statute. Chief among them was the
disproportionate economic position enjoyed by the manufacturer
which prevents the dealer from bargaining effectively with him.
Moreover, each dealer affects a substantial segment of his com-
munity's economy, and as a group, the dealers employ 668,000
persons. The committee reported that the unilateral franchise
agreement established a maximum of rights with a corresponding
minimum of liability for the manufacturers and that this con-
stituted a brimary source of the manufacturer's power over the
dealer. H. R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6720 (1956). Further, whenever a dealer was
subjected to economic duress or intimidation he could obtain
no redress in the courts, for they refused to add any requirement
of "good faith" to the contract, insisting that the contract was
complete in itself. Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 116 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1940); Buggs v. Ford Motor Co., 113
F.2d 618 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 688 (1940); Ford Motor
Co. v Kirkmeyer Motor Co., 65 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1933).
The minority report had several objections to the act, the
first being that the act imposed an unwarranted interference
with the freedom to contract. Secondly, the legislation was said
to be aimed at a special class, the automobile dealers, without
including other dealers who operate under a franchise and with-
out any apparent reason for such a distinction between franchised
dealers. Thirdly, it was objected that the statute gives a cause
of action to the dealer for a manufacturer's lack of "good faith,"
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but does not give any corresponding right of action to the manu-
facturer against a dealer's lack of "good faith." Lastly, the
minority insisted that the manufacturer will have to run the
gauntlet of the federal judicial system to determine just what
is meant by "good faith." H. R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.,
U.S. CODE CoNa. & AD. NEWS 6728 (1956). An individual ob-
jection in addition to the committee report noted that the right
to bring a suit on a contract on the ground that the party was
not dealt with in "good faith" is an innovation for the American
legal system. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6732 (1956).
The state statutes governing this relationship have been of
varied effectiveness. Three state statutes have been construed
by the courts within a few months of the passage of the Auto-
mobile Dealers Act, with conflicting constitutional results.
In General Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp. 381 (D. Colo.
1956), the court held invalid a Colorado statute requiring an
automobile manufacturer to refrain from cancelling or refusing
to renew a franchise "without due regard to the equities of
said dealer and without just provocation." CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-11-14 (8) - (10) (Supp. 1955). The court held that the test
of guilt did not provide an ascertainable standard and therefore
was a denial of due process of law. The argument that admini-
strative regulation could overcome any defect in the standard was
rejected because the statute did not provide a primary standard
which the administrative body could use. The public policy
argument was dismissed because the relative economic standing
of the two groups could not be judicially noticed, the legislature
had declared no specific intent, and there was no evidence to
sustain the contention that it was a reasonable exercise of police
power. Significantly, the Colorado statute provided penal sanc-
tions and consequently a more definite standard was constitution-
ally required than in the case of a statute which grants a purely
civil right of action such as the Automobile Dealers Act. See
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948). Four other states
have statutes governing this relationship which use the same
standard as a criterion for cancellation of licences which was
declared too vague in the Colorado statute, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 320.64 (8) (1943); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-611 (10) (Supp. 1955);
VA. CODE ANN. § 46-534 (3) (1950); WIS. STAT. 218.01 (3) (a)
(17) (1955).
In Willys Motors, Inc. v. Northwest Kaiser-Willys, Inc., 142 F.
Supp. 469 (D. Minn. 1956), a Minnesota statute requiring a "just
cause" be shown for a termination or failure to renew a dealer's
franchise was held constitutional. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 168.27 (14)
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(3) (Supp. 1955). The court held that the fact that the statute
involved only the direct selling agreements of automobile dealers
did not make the statute private. It reasoned that a statute which
alleviated an adverse economic condition threating 1,400 auto-
mobile dealers in the state was directed towards a public purpose,
since the same condition affected indirectly a substantial segment
of the state's economy. The court made no comment as to the
test to be applied in determining the legality of the termination,
except to say it was a question for the jury whether a "just cause"
was shown.
Where a Wisconsin statute made it grounds for revocation of
the manufacturer's license if the manufacturer should cancel
a dealer's franchise "unfairly" and "without due regard as to the
equities of said dealer," WIs. STAT. 218.01 (3) (a) (17) (1955), the
court upheld it as a valid exercise of the state's police power and
therefore a proper basis for civil suit by the dealer. Kuhi Motor
Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 270 Wis. 488, 71 N.W.2d 420 (1955). In a
four to three decision, the majority held that the statute was an
expression of public policy, the promotion of fair dealing being
a legitimate exercise of police power by the legislature. The
minority reasoned that the statute did not affect a public interest,
finding nothing injurious to the public welfare in a manufacturer's
termination of a dealer's franchise. Inequality of bargaining power
is present in many contractual relationships but the law does
not attempt to equalize them by impairing the basic right of
contract. 71 N.W.2d at 425.
Although the decisions are few and the applicability of the
police power theory open to serious question, the weight of
authority, at least where the statutes only provide a civil rather
than a penal sanction, upholds the constitutionality of these
statutes even at the state level. One avenue of attack upon the
state statutes will not be available against the federal act: the
failure to provide a corresponding cause of action for the manu-
facturer because of a dealer's lack of good faith may be unequal
protection of the law but this is not a constitutional defense to
a federal statute, for, unlike the fourteenth amendment, the
fifth amendment has no "equal protection" clause. Sunshine
Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 401 (1940).
The Automobile Dealers Act does not invalidate any state
statute unless the latter clearly is irreconcilable, PuB. L. No. 1026,
84th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 5 (Aug. 18, 1956), but the enactment
should provide a basis for more uniformity in legal treatment of
the distributive organization of the automotive industry.
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